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Target Agents of the Executive Summary 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Considering the multidisciplinarity of our work, that produces a philosophical argument through neurobiological scientific 
evidence, and taking into account that proposes the concept of an integrative model to understand consciousness (with a 
skeleton of operable variables, but poorly defined in mathematical terms) we estimate that the following natural step on this 
work is to establish a multidisciplinary research group dedicated to providing a deeper development to the model with the 
common effort of different disciplines as physics, computational science, neurobiology, psychology and philosophy. To reach 
this, we propose that the target agent of the executive summary must be a decisive part of an institution capable of putting 
together the necessary economic, material and human resources to found the multidisciplinary research group and to 
establish a scientific research program. In the public Catalan ambit, we could think in directives of institutions like CSIC 
(Consell Superior d’Investigacions Científiques) and every university on its horizon. In the private ambit, a directive of a 
business with powerful departments of I+D combining scientific and computational research, with interest in transhumanist 







The unobservability of experience in a third-person perspective, that apparently limits the scientific 
approaching over the conceptualization and understanding of consciousness, fertilized a field where neo-
dualist theories are growing up with philosophical and neuroscientific support, as well as anthropocentric 
top-down approaches are restricting the debate to humans. Considering this state of the art, we identified 
the necessity to strengthen the strict scientific physicalism, especially based on what neurobiology can 
explain about the nature of the subjective experience, maintaining a phylogenetic perspective on the 
evolution of the nervous systems. 
 To do that, we selected three cutting-edge neuroscientific theoretical frameworks related with 
consciousness and experience: The Neurobiological Naturalism from Dr Todd E. Feinberg and Dr Jon M. 
Mallatt, that sets a proposal on the neurobiological features of an organism to be conscious, the Two-
Stage Model from Dr Michael H. Herzog and his colleagues, that proposes a real-time perceptive 
mechanism based on the experimental evidence, and the Neuronal Global Workspace of Stanislas 
Dehaene and his colleagues, a proposal based in the real-time processes of the brain, as well as some 
crucial neural structures. 
 Through the filtering and selection of the trunk variables of each model, and the development of 
a set of foundational axioms, we produced our own model: The Integrative Neurobiological Model of 
Consciousness (INMC), that tries to explain what is consciousness, with the combined potential of the 
three previous approaches. The INMC presented the capacity to be formulated, and every variable of it 
showed mutually dependence (see Figure 1).  
 The neural structure of the INMC contemplates the necessity of different functional networks: 
topographic single-sense structures, multisensory integration structures, salience coding structures, 
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 Figure 1. INMC formula 
Excepting the Synchronization variable, that performs a restrictive role on the expression, the other variables are operable sets of minor processes 
or structures that remit to the neuron as the minimal unit: located in a three-dimensioned space, synapsed with other neurons and activated 
during specific lapses of time. The full work of mathematical operationalization includes every hierarchy of every set. 
 
Finally, the INMC, once developed, and referring directly to the statements of its theoretical framework, 
implies the following hypothesis: 
 
Working hypothesis of the INMC 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
• Null Hypothesis: Consciousness is an emergent property 
• First Hypothesis: Consciousness is a process that brain does 




To put under test the hypothesis we selected the lamprey fishes (considered one of the first vertebrates) 
as an animal model to compare the INMC with a phylogenetical crucial organism that according to the 
Neurobiological Naturalism, could be conscious. Once the fitness between the animal model and the 
INMC have been tested, we searched for differential criteria: this is, criteria that authors without relation 
with our referential theoretical frameworks proposed to consider the existence of consciousness in 
animals. The third step has been the crossed comparison between the INMC, the lamprey brain and the 
considered crucial features for consciousness in humans. This allowed us to test at the same time the 
validity of the model and the possible presence of consciousness in lampreys, first ensuring its mutual 
fitness, second testing the animal model with alternative criteria, and finally testing the animal model and 
the INMC with criteria applied on clearly conscious organisms. 
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The evidence research in every step has been realized within a qualitative systematic review using the 
following databases: NCBI and PubMed, ResearchGate, PsycInfo, Scopus, and scientific editorials and 
journals: Elsevier, Frontiers in Psychology, MIT Press, Scientific American, Nature and Science. The 
selection conditions for the referenced papers have been: (1) English as the only language admitted (2) 
at least 80% of the references must be from 2009 to actuality when related to the field of neuroscience 
and (3) the observational data must be extracted from papers non-related to the theoretical framework 
of the INMC. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The neurobiological evidence collected confirms the presence of topographic sensory structures in 
lamprey brains, as well as multisensory integration structures. Our minimal-vertebrate model also 
presents salience coding structures on its tectum, as well as memory structures based on its pallium. The 
presence of reward-seeking and misery-fleeing behaviours on the animal allows us to infer its neural 
valence coding structures. Moreover, thanks to recent studies on the neurobiology of lamprey, as well as 
experimental evidence of perceptive illusion on three species of fishes, we can infer the presence of a 
perception coding structure on its brain. Finally, the lamprey also presents neural supporting systems 
that allows the spatiotemporal synchronization of the electrochemical activity. 
 
In the second test, the lamprey showed fitness with all the 11 collected variables, based on the criteria of 
other authors to infer consciousness in animals. In the final test, the INMC and the lamprey fishes showed 
high compatibility with all the 10 collected variables, based on the criteria of other authors to infer 
consciousness specifically in humans. Although the null hypothesis cannot be refuted because of the 
ontological problem of experience, the amount of evidence allows us to defend that consider 
consciousness as a process that the brain does until proven otherwise, and that consider consciousness 
at least a vertebrate function until proven otherwise is the most parsimonious, simpler and ethical, as 
well as the unique falsifiable approach by the time. 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Concluding, the INMC proposes that consciousness is a continuous process that the brain does, and that 
can be found in at least every vertebrate. The continuity of the process implies a loop where every actual 
perception is the result of the previous neural activity correspondent to the anterior perception, with new 
internal activity, and the new entrance of external stimuli (see Figure 2). 
This implies that the qualities of experience are only convictions of the same system that is generating it. 
Convictions that are trapped in a continuous loop of cause-effect, without any necessity of emergent 
properties to explain it. The unique reality that can exist by a perceptive system is the perceived reality, 
or in other words, the experience and the experiencing subject are the same. Thus, there is no necessity 
to establish a gap between the redness of red and the neural processes that encode for the red experience, 
because the redness of an object is an inescapable conviction of the system, a neural classification 
spatiotemporally determined that only have sense inside a loop of many processes that contextualizes 
and signify its data. 
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At the moment that we conclude that there is nothing essential or permanent in us but the convincement 
of the system about its agency, that is also a functionality based on the neural architecture and processes, 
we can suggest that consciousness could theoretically be replicated, considering that a replicated system 
will share all the same convincements. 
Figure 2. The INMC Loop 
But the applicability of the INMC is not only philosophical. Its formula is conceived to be a skeleton of 
robust variables that are major sets of other lesser components, that at the same time are sets of other 
lesser components, with a very origin on the neuron itself. Thus, the INMC expression is not an operable 
formula but a template especially thought to be converted in algorithms, this is, to provide a background 
for programming experiments, with applicability on virtual agent development, artificial consciousness 
development and computational neuroscience improvements with applications on understanding 
perception (therefore, with clinical possibilities). Finally, the INMC also open an ethical debate. Its 
scientific development could contribute to the revision of our actual animal treatment politics and the 
increase of the consideration of the suffering, in at least, every vertebrate specie. 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
Development of a first proposal on the Integrative 
Neurobiological Model of Consciousness through a 
phylogenetic perspective on the nervous system 
 




Marçal Castán Sogas 
 















Development of a first proposal on the INMC  Press Release 




The Mind-Body Problem Unveiled: an integrative neurobiological 
approach could close the gap between the experience and its neural 
correlates 
The findings also suggest that every vertebrate in the animal phylogeny could be conscious 
PRESS RELEASE 
Barcelona, 21 March 2020 
“What consciousness really is?” is an ancient question that remits to the concept of mind, and the 
unbridgeable problem that arises when we try to explain the subjective experience through the observation 
of the neural processes. The redness of red, for us, the experiencing subjects, is clearly something different 
than an intricated chain of firing neurons. We live with the conviction of the existence of the properties that 
we feel and observe, and to think on the contrary is to think against common sense. But what if I told you 
that, for the neurobiology, there is no reason to consider these properties something different than neural 
processes? 
The recently developed Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness propose exactly this 
statement. Through the integration of three promising and cutting-edge neuroscientific approaches, the 
model has been able to provide a snapshot of what consciousness could be, and the scientific evidence 
suggests that there is no need to consider it more than a process that the brain does. This is possible 
because the brain is an organ that evolved through the animal phylogeny to adapt the behaviour of the 
mobile organism to its environment: the bodies acquired receptors of the physical and chemical events 
around and inside them, and the receptors had been attached to specific neurons. With a brain that 
represents the activity of each receptor with a single neuron, more and more functionalities are possible 
inside it. When many senses are integrated to generate global maps of the situation, the resulting 
experience is not a simple sum of inputs: there are many possibilities to interpret the situation, and the brain 
actively decides what is the best one. The brain actively builds the reality. 
This is, thanks to a systematic 
qualitative review of recent 
neuroscientific evidence, that proved 
the fitness of the model with more 
than 20 behavioural and 
neurobiological variables based on 
consciousness, the INMC suggests 
that the features that allow 
consciousness in humans are also 
present in lamprey fishes. This implies, 
as it is shown in the figure, that every 
vertebrate in the animal kingdom 
could be conscious. 
 
 
The Vertebrate Evolving Tree 
MYA: Million Years Ago. The moment where a 
branch of the evolving tree is split up. 
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But, besides the ethical implications of these findings, the INMC also suggest that consciousness, as a 
process sustained in the physical known laws, could eventually be developed in artificial contexts, or 
inclusive could be eventually replicated. Although this science-fiction statement, the increasing interest in 
transhumanist technologies and the artificial agent development is a real business of the present, and the 
INMC makes a (tiny) contribution to advance in the computational conceptualization on its big protagonist. 
Even though its weaknesses, the INMC is an invitation to unite efforts between scientific disciplines to 
understand better the unique window to the world that we have: our very subjective experience.   
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Abstract 
The actual state of the art over the scientific and philosophical problem of consciousness includes approaches based on new 
forms of dualism. Considering the necessity of strengthening the eliminatory and strict physicalism, we developed a model of 
consciousness that integrates three neurobiological cutting-edge theoretical frameworks. The interlace of the Neurobiological 
Naturalism, the Two-Stage model of perception and the Neuronal Global Workspace, as well as own proposals of 
characterization and operationalization of the variables involved in consciousness, provided us two working hypotheses: 
consciousness is a process and is at least a vertebrate characteristic. The hypotheses have been tested through a triple 
comparison based on neurobiological evidence. We have selected the lamprey as a possible conscious organism and we first 
tested its fitness with the Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness. Then, we tested the neurobiological and 
behavioural features of lamprey within differential criterion about animal consciousness, and finally we compared the 
neurobiological hallmarks of consciousness in humans with the characteristics of lamprey and the INMC. Our results suggest 
that the INMC presents a high fitness with many scientific criteria about consciousness, and that exist a high possibility of the 
presence of sensory consciousness in lamprey fishes. We conclude that consciousness can be explained through brain 
processes without the necessity of emergent properties or phenomenal entities, and despite more data is needed, the most 
parsimonious and ethical approach would be to consider at least all the vertebrates as possible conscious organisms. 
Key words: Consciousness, animal consciousness, Neurobiological Naturalism, Two-Stage Model, Neuronal Global Workspace, neurobiology of 
consciousness, consciousness criteria, lamprey nervous system, Qualia, Hard Problem. 
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1.1. Motivation and Objectives 
The problem of consciousness, or the so-called “mind-body problem”, has been a subject of study mostly 
related for centuries with Philosophy, Theology, and the concept of soul (Crick & Koch, 1992). During the 
early 20th century, psychologists like William James started to focus his attention on it (James & Shook, 
2011), but despite their implication, the concept itself has been conceived by many scientists to be too 
much philosophical and abstract to be studied through experimentation (Crick & Koch, 1992). Although, 
during the last decades, and probably thanks to the advances in brain sciences, we experienced an 
explosion of proposals concerning the problem of consciousness, both philosophical and neuroscientific 
approaches (Cavanna & Nani, 2014). Despite this recent scientific interest on consciousness, the actual 
knowledge about the real-time activity on the brain is limited. This handicap, combined with the 
ontological problem of experience (is unobservable), fertilized a field where neo-dualist theories are 
growing up with apparent scientific support, as well as the phylogenetic top-down approaches are 
centring the debate in humans.  
 Considering this state of the art, we identified a necessity to strengthen the scientific approach 
over the problem of consciousness. It is needed a defence inspired on the strict physicalism, and especially 




Box 1. Establishment of the central objectives 
 
1. Prove through evidence that consciousness is a neurobiological process that does not need to be conceived as an 
emergent property of matter. 
2. Prove through evidence that consciousness is a neurobiological process present, at least, in all the vertebrates. 
 
 
To do that, we present an own model of consciousness: The Integrative Neurobiological Model of 
Consciousness (INMC), conceived to integrate the cutting-edge neuroscientific and neurobiological 
theoretical frameworks in a single functional approach that allow us to answer the central questions: 
“what is consciousness?” and “where can we find consciousness?”.  
 Through this work, the explanatory capacity of the INMC will be tested. Its simplicity (see Feuer, 
1957; Friedman, 1974; Sober, 1975; Walsh, 1979; Thagard, 1988; Kitcher, 1989; Baker, 2003; Scorzato, 
2012), falsifiability (see Popper, 1959) and its eliminatory nature (see Dennett, 1992) are three qualities 
that provides to the model the potential to offer a solid and a scientific solution to the philosophical topics 
on consciousness: the Hard Problem (Chalmers, 2010), the famous Nagel’s “what is like to be a bat?” 
(Nagel, 1974) or the Explanatory Gap from Joseph Levine (1983). Moreover, INMC presents the potential 
to provide answers to other concerns about consciousness like its functionality in nature, its continuity in 
a single organism along with its life, or its computational replicability. 
 But the Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness, and the objectives of this work, are 
the product of two recent theoretical frameworks: The Neurobiological Naturalism (NN) from Dr Todd E. 
Feinberg and Dr Jon M. Mallatt (see Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2018; 2019), that sets 
a proposal on the neurobiological features of an organism to be conscious, and the Two-Stage Model 
(TSM) from Dr Michael H. Herzog and his colleagues, that sets important responses on the problem of 
perception continuity (Herzog et al., 2016), and offers a real-time perceptive mechanism based on the 
experimental evidence. The combining of these two scientific models results in an approach that highly 
fits with the Neuronal Global Workspace (NGW) of Stanislas Dehaene (Mashour et al.,2020), a proposal 
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also based in the real-time processes of the brain. These three theoretical frameworks are the very 
foundations of the INMC. Although there exists an extended horizon of perspectives on the problem of 
consciousness that will interact with our work, our effort will be centred on the integration and defence 
of their proposals, as well as the interpretation of its implications. 
 
1.2. Theoretical Framework 
1.2.1.  Neurobiological Naturalism 
Todd E. Feinberg and Jon M. Mallatt are the first influential authors of this work. The extensive review of 
their thesis (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2018; 2019) provided us a rich and elegant 
neurobiological background with philosophical and phylogenetical perspectives. Their contributions to 
the state of the art are the following: 
 
 
Box 2. Neurobiological Naturalism Thesis 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
• The minimum requirement for sensory consciousness is a brain, including a forebrain, midbrain and hindbrain, with 
hierarchical systems of intercommunicating, isomorphically-organized processing nuclei that extensively integrate the 
different senses into representations, and a widespread reticular formation that integrates the sensory inputs and 
contributes to attention, awareness and neural synchronization (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013). In resume, the organisms 
that translate sensory arrays into mental images possess sensory consciousness (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013). This can only 
be observed in nervous systems with a spinal cord, a hindbrain with myelencephalon and metencephalon (including pons 
and cerebellum), midbrain with tegmentum and tectum, forebrain with diencephalon (including pretectum, thalamus, 
pineal gland, neurohypophysis, prethalamus and hypothalamus) and a telencephalon with cerebral hemispheres, as well 
as a greater limbic system, a reticular formation and autonomic nervous system (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2017). 
 
• Consciousness is a neurobiological process that corresponds to certain animals with special neurobiological features 
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2018; 2019). A group of characteristics that depends on the presence of 
previous evolutive traits and explain the specific conditions of the nature of consciousness. Thus, consciousness shares 
the features of all the living organisms; it is based on the cell as the key unit, is embodied, is a process which mechanisms 
and functions depend on the actions of the individual parts, it is restricted to a specific system in which the interactions 
between the parts are critical, and responds to a hierarchy of different interacting levels and progressive complexity 
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2019). Then, the special neurobiological features are presented as (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2019): 
 
o “Neural complexity (more than in a simple core brain) 
• Brain with many neurons (<100.000?) 
• Many subtypes of neurons 
o Elaborated sensory organs 
• Eyes, touch receptors, taste, smell 
o Neural hierarchies with neuron-neuron interactions 
• With reciprocal interaction in and between pathways for the different senses. 
• That generates computing modules, distributed but integrated. 
• With synchronized communication by brain-wave oscillations. 
• Where the high levels allow the complex processing and unity of consciousness. 
• With hierarchies that let consciousness predict events a fraction of a second in advance. 
o Pathways that create mapped mental images or affective states 
• Neurons arranged in topographic maps of the outside world and body structures. 
• Valence coding of good and bad, for affective states. 
• Feed into pre-motor brain regions to motivate, choose and guide movements in space. 
o Brain mechanisms for selective attention and arousal 
o Memory, short-term or longer” 
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• The appearance of sensory consciousness in the animal kingdom is coincident with the explosive radiation of animals in 
the Cambrian Period. Concretely, with the evolution of the distant senses, or the high-resolution eyes: a process 
completed by 520 mya (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2017). Moreover, vision’s neural pathways could have served as an 
organizational template for the expansion of other senses (Butler, 2000; Feinberg & Mallatt, 2017). 
 
• Two big markers of consciousness in a phylogenetic level are the optic tectum and the eyes. The modern lamprey 
represents the oldest living vertebrate and is considered to be conscious since it presents all the required neurobiological 
features. This implies that all the rest of vertebrates matches the criteria for sensory consciousness (Feinberg & Mallatt, 
2017), although they differentiate tectum-based consciousness from cortex-based consciousness (Feinberg & Mallatt, 
2019). Moreover, some invertebrates match with the criteria of the special neurobiological features, despite they do not 
present the features in the same brain areas: some arthropods and cephalopods are candidates to be sensory conscious 
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2019). 
 
• Sensory consciousness can be divided into three partially overlapping domains: exteroceptive, affective and 
interoceptive. The exteroceptive domain is constructed through sensory maps, the affective domain is constructed 
through internal valences, and the interoceptive domain is an in-between domain that includes both mapped sensory 





Todd E. Feinberg and Jon M. Mallatt remarks de diversity of causes and mechanisms behind 
sensory consciousness: their thesis is a proposal that charges against the approach of many actual theories 
that are trying to reduce consciousness to single features or few components: fundamental forces, 
quantum microtubules, a global workspace, integrated information, cognitive and computational 
capacities, reciprocal and oscillatory neuronal communications, attentional aspects, new complex physics, 
predictive properties or contextual emergence in systems theory (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2019). All those 
theories are establishing the problem in a few causes. The value of the proposal of the Neurobiological 
Naturalism is specifically the consideration of the biological and neurobiological complexity by which 
consciousness can be explained (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2018; 2019). They 
encourage and puts in evidence the necessity of integrative theories to approach the problem (Feinberg 
& Mallatt, 2019). 
Finally, on their first paper from 2013, they propose a way to test their thesis: the finding of re-
entrant and recurrent processing on the thalamo-tectal pathways in fishes could mean that whenever 
sensory information reaches a successive level in a hierarchy, the higher level sends signals back to the 
lower levels, as it has been demonstrated occurs in the mammalian brain of higher primates (Feinberg & 
Mallatt, 2013). 
 
1.2.2. Two-Stage Model 
According to the Two-Stage Model of perception, the sensory inputs are first unconsciously analyzed in a 
period of at least 400 ms during that the information is processed and classified in a coherent structure 
of signals, to afterwards broadcast the refined data into a widespread system that receives and encodes 
the final perception. The Two-Stage Model resolves the paradigm of the time window over perception, 
where two opposed schools argued over the years if the perception is continuous or discrete through the 
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Box 3. Two-Stage Model Proposal 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
• Sensory stimuli are encoded with quasi-continuous resolution: this is, from 1ms to hundreds of milliseconds. 
• Sensory information remains unperceived at least during 400 ms. This is the time that the brain uses to integrate, 
coordinate, signify and codify the global entrance of data. 
• During an unknown period (<400ms) the brain generates a global map of successes through the integrated and re-
encoded data. 
This implies that the brain does not perceive continuously from the crude sensory data of the environment 
and itself, but it has structures that allow the codification of integrated results, to interpret the merged 
information in inferior times and lesser neurons. The Two-Stage Model proposes that the perception of 
time it is not the perception of a real-time continuous entrance, but a specific neural code that resumes 
and encodes for periods of time (Herzong et al., 2016). The implications of this approach seem crucial to 
understanding the building blocks of the organismic subjective perception or sensory consciousness: the 
world is perceived in snapshots, but snapshots that include all the crucial and quasi-continuous data of 
the last moment; the duration of the stimuli, its order, its significance, salience, etc. (Herzong et al., 2016). 
Through this model, all the paradigmatic perceptive experiments and the dilemma of continuity vs 
discrete percepts are elegantly resolved (Herzong et al., 2016). 
 
1.2.3. Neuronal Global Workspace 
The thesis of Stanislas Dehaene proposes the existence of a widespread but defined neuronal network 
with localized, specialized and modular cortical areas that process perceptions, as well as motor 
responses, memory and evaluative information with widely distributed excitatory neurons with long-
range connectivity that forms reciprocally connected tracts with the capacity of ensuring or suppress the 
contribution of specific neural processors (Mashour et al.,2020). This distributed reticular formation of 
neurons is conceived with the ability to receive bottom-up information and transmit top-down results to 
the different processors. Therefore, its role consist of receiving and broadcasting information (Mashour 
et al.,2020). The Neuronal Global Workspace also introduces a concept called ignition (Mashour et 
al.,2020) that the Two-Stage Model named attractor state (Herzong et al., 2016). This is, ignition is the 
sudden, coherent and exclusive activation of subsets of neurons inside the global workspace that codes 
for the current conscious content (Mashour et al.,2020). The rest of the neurons of the NGW are inhibited 
during the ignition, and the event can be provoked by external stimuli or can be triggered by spontaneous 
and stochastic activity (Mashour et al.,2020). 
 The specific form of the NGW is conceived as a distributed net of neurons through many brain 
regions with the capacity to amplify, sustain and send the information to specialized thalamocortical 
loops, with a special contribution of the prefrontal cortex in humans, but not restricted to it (Mashour et 
al.,2020). The NGW proposed five different components being integrated in the global workspace 
(Mashour et al.,2020) (see Box 5). 
 
The different variables and features of the three models allowed us to develop the INMC with a 
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Box 4. Neuronal Global Workspace Main Components 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
• Evaluative Systems (Value) 
• Attentional Systems (Focusing) 
• Long-Term Memory (Past) 
• Motor Systems (Future) 
• Perceptual Systems (Present) 
• Neuronal Global Workspace 
 
2. METHOD 
This work has been realized through a conjunct of methodical steps. The first step has been the 
development of the Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness (see Appendix 1) based on the 
Neurobiological Naturalism, the Two-Stage Model and the Neuronal Global Workspace. The common and 
remarkable features of the three approaches have been merged, characterized and operationalized to be 
concreted and mutually related. The second stage has consisted in the establishment of the working 
hypothesis based on the objectives of this work: 
 
 
Box 5. Working hypothesis of the Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
• Null Hypothesis: Consciousness is an emergent property 
• First Hypothesis: Consciousness is a process that brain does 
• Second Hypothesis: Consciousness is at least a vertebrate function 
 
The subsequent step has been the design of a method to put under test the hypothesis. First, we selected 
the lampreys as an animal model to compare the INMC with an organism that according to the 
Neurobiological Naturalism, could be conscious. Once the fitness between the animal model and the 
INMC have been tested, we searched for differential criteria: this is, criteria that authors without relation 
with our referential theoretical frameworks proposed to consider the existence of consciousness in 
animals. The third and last test has been the crossed comparison between the INMC, the lamprey brain 
and the considered crucial features for consciousness in humans. This allowed us to test at the same time 
the validity of the model and the possible presence of consciousness in lampreys, first ensuring its mutual 
fitness, second testing the bounded model with alternative criteria, and finally testing the model with 
criteria applied on clearly conscious organisms. 
 
The evidence research has been realized within a qualitative systematic review using the following 
databases: NCBI and PubMed, ResearchGate, PsycInfo, Scopus, and scientific editorials and journals: 
Elsevier, Frontiers in Psychology, MIT Press, Scientific American, Nature and Science. The main searching 
words have been: Consciousness; origin of consciousness; animal consciousness; primary consciousness; 
minimal consciousness; neural topographic maps; neural sensory maps; neural basis of consciousness; 
nervous system evolution; lamprey nervous system; neural networks. Every paper or book in the 
neuroscientific field has been extracted from the previous enlisted research portals without exception, 
thus ensuring the compliance of ethical and legal requirements inherent to the publication standards. In 
the field of philosophy of mind, all the papers consulted have been extracted from the database PhilPapers 
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or from the UAB library’s catalogue, also ensuring the compliance of ethical and legal requirements from 
European and American standards of publication. Finally, the selection conditions for the referenced 
papers have been: (1) English as the only language admitted (2) at least 80% of the references must be 
from 2009 to actuality when related to the field of neuroscience and (3) the observational data must have 
been extracted from papers unrelated with the work of Todd E. Feinberg & Jon M. Mallatt. 
       
3. INTEGRATIVE NEUROBIOLOGICAL MODEL OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
3.1. Variable extraction from the referential models 
The development of the INMC (see Appendix 1) starts with the selection of the relevant variables from 
the influential models. This exercise is done with a cross-comparison of trunk variables between the three 
referential approaches of our work. Figure 1 illustrates the process of the relation between the variables, 
where it can be observed that every final variable of the INMC appears at least in two different 
approaches. The extracted variables have been: (1) Perception Coding Structures with the capacity of 
predictive processing, (2) Timeframes, (3) Topographic sensory structures with single-sense integration 
and (4) Multisensory Integration Structures, as well as (5) Valence Coding, (6) Salience Coding, (7) Memory 
and (8) Pre-motor Structures. Finally: (9) Neural Synchronization. We divided the sensory structures into 
single-sense integration architectures and multisensory architectures to differentiate between processes 
that can take place in single structures, from higher processes that need to be involved in long-range 
activity between different areas. 
  
Figure 1. Variable relationship between referential theoretical frameworks and the INMC 
Designed through a review on the Neurobiological Naturalism (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2017; 2018; 2019), the Neuronal Global 
Workspace (Mashour et al.,2020) and the Two-Stage Model (Herzong et al., 2016). 
 
3.2. INMC axioms 
Although the extracted variables are highly explicative, the principal objective of this model is to offer a 
first explanation of how consciousness can be conceived simply as a process. To reach this, we developed 
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a list of foundational axioms of the model that helped us to interpret the interaction between the 
variables, as well as set some strong precepts in which build our conclusions, crucially related with the 
evolution of the nervous system. 
 
 
Box 6. Foundational Axioms of the Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
• A1. Neurons are stimuli-response organisms. 
▪ A1.1 A stimuli for a neuron is any physical or chemical change on its close environment that produces 
organismic responses. 
▪ A1.2 The effects of the cellular response of one or multiple neurons can be interpreted as stimuli by other 
neurons. 
▪ A1.3 Neurons can establish nets in which each cell is physically related to others through synapsis. 
▪ A1.4 Synapsis are specialized structures in which neurons can physically determine consecutive stimuli-
response relationships over time, thus increasing its correlational activity. 
▪ A1.5 The physically determined synapsis allows a specific spatiotemporal correspondence between neurons, 
as well as its isolation from others, thus specific nets become specialized. 
▪ A1.6 The capacity of the neurons to generate specialized nets incorporated new functionalities to the bodies 
of their organisms. 
▪ A1.7 New nervous functionalities carried new opportunities to increase organismic fitness over competitors. 
▪ A1.8 The specialized functionalities evolved through the nervous system evolution. 
• A2. The early evolution of the nervous system is characterized by the expansion of the number of neurons between 
receptors and the resultant motor response of the organism. 
• A3. The evolution of the nervous system is characterized by the acquisition of new nervous functionalities. 
• A4. The evolution of the nervous system promoted the acquisition of new specialized sensory receptors and organs. 
• A5. Organisms with the functionality of integrating sensory processed information from different receptors increased 
its fitness. 




The axioms reveal the necessity to put the attention on the minimal component of the brain: the neurons, 
and build all the boundaries between variables through this unit. Moreover, we identify the necessity to 
differentiate the structural variables (this is, what a nervous system needs to reach consciousness) from 
the process variables: the activity of these structures in real-time. A nervous system cannot be conscious 
without specific and diverse structural components, but even with these architectures, consciousness is 
not defined. It is needed a process through the structures during specific timeframes. Without patterns 
of neural activity, consciousness cannot exist, and without specialized and trunk structures, the patterns 
of neural activity cannot be considered conscious experience. Thus, the INMC integrates all the variables 
of its theoretical framework through our own proposal on the neural activity patterns. 
 
3.3. INMC final components 
The final components of the INMC have been mathematically characterized to facilitate its mutual 
relationship. Our interest resided to generate a template of mathematical relations that allow us to 
present consciousness as a process, thus supporting the logical and scientific reasoning. Since our 
mathematical knowledge is deficient, the operationalization has been carried using undefined functions 
and conjuncts: this implies that we are not proposing the formula of consciousness, but a castle of 
interactions, too much intricated by the moment to be specified, but with a structure and identified 
components. Every conjunct and every unspecified function represent a field of knowledge unknown by 
us, but we hope the global structure is sufficiently determined to promote new computational, 
mathematical and bioscientific thinking over this field. 
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The final components have been: (1) Structural variables, (2) Time Window, (3) Externally Triggered 
Processes, (4) Internally Triggered Processes, (5) Spatiotemporal Synchronization, (6) Perceptive Patterns. 
 
 
Box 7. Structural Variables of the INMC 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Includes all the architectural variables: this is, how a brain capable to be conscious is organized. Its minimal unit is the neuron 
(𝑢𝑖  (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) that takes a specific position in the tridimensional space. The physical, chemical and electrical relationship 
between neurons is established by a function that represents the synapsis: 
 
𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠(𝑢𝑖1(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑢𝑖2(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) 
 
Every functional module of interrelated neurons (𝜔𝑘) is represented by a function that puts in relation different synapsed 
neurons (𝑠𝑛): 
𝜔𝑘 = ℎ(𝑠1, 𝑠2 … 𝑠𝑛) 
 
And different functional modules establish bigger modules with combined capacities. For example: 
 
𝜔4 = 𝜔(𝜔1 , 𝜔2, 𝜔3) 
 
In addition, a brain capable to be conscious needs to be composed by interrelated big neural networks with topographic single 
sense integration (𝑇𝑜𝑝), multisensory integration (𝐼𝑛𝑡), valence coding (𝑉𝑎𝑙), salience coding (𝑆𝑎𝑙), memory (𝑀𝑒𝑚), and 
perception (with predictive capacities) structures (𝑃𝑒𝑟): 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑝 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑖 … 𝜔𝑙) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑟 … 𝜔𝑠) 
𝑉𝑎𝑙, 𝑆𝑎𝑙, 𝑀𝑒𝑚 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑚 … 𝜔𝑛) 
𝑃𝑒𝑟 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑗 … 𝜔𝑘) 
 
The whole conjunct of this networks constitutes the structures of a brain with the capacity to be conscious: 
 
Π = {𝜔1, 𝜔2 … 𝜔𝑘} = {𝑇𝑜𝑝, 𝐼𝑛𝑡, 𝑉𝑙, 𝑆𝑙, 𝐿𝑛, 𝑃𝑒𝑟} 
 
Note that by the time the pre-motor structures have been neglected because of a lack of data about its specific contribution 




Box 8. Time Window 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The Time Window of conscious experience includes two moments: ∆𝑡𝛼 and  ∆𝑡𝛽 
∆𝑡𝛼 is conceived to be the lapse of time where all the structure processes the whole inputs, and ∆𝑡𝛽 is conceived to be the 
lapse of time where all the processed inputs are broadcasted to the perception structures. Each lapse of time can be thought 
as a conjunct of minor timeframes: 
 
∆𝑡𝛼 =  {∆𝑡𝑚𝑛} =  {∆𝑡𝑚1 , ∆𝑡𝑚2 , ∆𝑡𝑚3 , … } 
∆𝑡𝑚 = {∆𝑡𝑤𝑛} =  {∆𝑡𝑤1 , ∆𝑡𝑤2 , ∆𝑡𝑤3 , … } 
Where ∆𝑡𝛼 > 400𝑚𝑠 
Where ∆𝑡𝑚 < 400𝑚𝑠 
Where  ∆𝑡𝑤 < ∆𝑡𝑚 <  ∆𝑡𝛼 
 
Also: 
∆𝑡𝛽 =  {∆𝑡𝑏𝑛} = {∆𝑡𝑏1 , ∆𝑡𝑏2,∆𝑡𝑏3 , … } 
Where ∆𝑡𝛽 < 400𝑚𝑠 and ∆𝑡𝛼 ≠  ∆𝑡𝛽  
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Box 9. Externally Triggered Processes 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The Externally Triggered Processes, or 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), are the resultant set of neural electrochemical activity provoked by stimuli 
from the external senses (body or environment) interacting in a cascade of stimuli-response activity between neurons. Its 
shape depends on the initial input and the characteristics of the neural architecture attached to the input entrance: 
 
𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼) = {𝑒𝑖} =  {𝑒1, 𝑒2 ,  𝑒3 , … } 
Where 𝑒𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛) = 𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖) 
Where 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛), 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) 
 
Where 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 is the response event of a neuron with the potential to activate a cascade of responses in a specific neural network, 




Box 10. Internally Triggered Processes 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The Internally Triggered Processes 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) can be originated in a previous moment by past stimuli-response patterns or can be 
also interpreted as the effect of cell clocks or chemical dynamics, including the effects of the glia, the maintenance of 
neurotransmitter in the synaptic space, etc. Therefore, includes all the causes of activity unrelated with the external 
receptors in the ∆𝑡𝛼 moment: 
𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) = {𝜈𝑖} =  {𝜈1 , 𝜈2 ,  𝜈3 , … } 
Where 𝜈𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛) = 𝜈(𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖) 
Where 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖 = 𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛)), 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) 
 
Where 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖 represents the inner or internally elicited activity of a neuron with the potential to activate a neural network. 
 
 
Box 11. Spatiotemporal Synchronization 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
While this model cannot explain how every neural network must behave to generate significant data, it is necessary to include 
a restrictive variable. Without the accomplishment of the Γ condition, the presence of 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) and Π cannot explain 
the conscious perception. Within this restriction we impose to the model that the patterns generated will be sufficiently 




Box 12. Perceptive Patterns 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
The Perceptive Patterns 𝐾 during ∆𝑡𝛽 will be the result of the spatiotemporally synchronized (Γ) previous Internally and 
Externally Triggered Processes, 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) and 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), through a structure Π. Specifically, the Perceptive Patterns will be found 
in the Perceptive Structures and its extensions along the whole system: 
 
𝐾(∆𝑡𝛽) = 𝐾(𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼), Π) ∙ Γ = {𝑘𝑛} =  {𝑘1, 𝑘2 , 𝑘3 , … } 
Where 𝑘𝑛(∆𝑡𝑏𝑛) = 𝑘(𝑒𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛), 𝜈𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛), 𝜔𝑗) ∙ Γ   
 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrates in an abstract way the two moments of the conscious perception of an 
organism through all the components of the INMC. The black and white graphic represents the structure 
of the brain with specialized neural networks, and the coloured relations represents the processes that 
take place alongside these structures. In every moment of the Time Window, all that is happening is a 
process: the brain does not reach a specific state of consciousness through these processes, but 
consciousness is the processes itself. 
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With the model introduced and the method explained, we present the results of the work. 
 
 
Figure 3. Abstract example of the resulting process of perception through the INMC 
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4. RESEARCH AND RESULTS        
4.1. Fitness of the INMC in lamprey fishes 
4.1.1. Topographic single sense integration and multisensory integration 
An elegant study from 2015 revealed the crucial role of the cranial neural crest cells (cNCCs) on the 
establishment of sequential order between peripheral sensory neurons and neural tube border cells in 
zebrafish embryo; a relation that sets the isomorphic structure of the sensory system (Zecca et al., 2015). 
This is, the presence of neural crest and placodes during the embryo development of an organism is a sign 
of its later sensory topographic structure.  
 In parallel, another study has been carried out with sea lampreys in an embryonic stage using 
gene expression ablation (CRISPR/Cas9 gene-editing) of SoxE2 and FoxD-A that encodes the homonymous 
neural crest transcription factors. The mutant groups of lamprey SoxE2 and FoxD-A revealed neural 
patterning defects on HuC/D-positive sensory neurons, being misplaced or dissociated of their 
corresponding ganglia (Yuan et al., 2020). Their results suggest that cNCCs are not required for cranial 
ganglia cell specification but for shaping the morphology of the sensory systems during the embryo 
development (Yuan et al., 2020). Hence, considering that lamprey presents neural crest and placodes, we 
can accept it as a carrier of isomorphic maps. Moreover, other evidence indicates that the medial pallium 
of ancestral fishes became specialized to generate navigation allocentric maps (Rodríguez et al., 2002), as 
well as the optic tectum of the lamprey receives data from the visual system and electrosensory inputs 
from the lateral line system (Suzuki & Grillner, 2018). 
 
4.1.2. Valence, salience, memory and perception coding structures 
Despite lampreys do not present amygdala, its brain explains a lot about the evolution of the limbic 
system. The ventral and lateral pallium of the first vertebrates evolved in later vertebrates to be the 
superficial and deep amygdalar nuclei, as well as the entire striatum and pallidum of the jawless fishes 
gave rise to the extended amygdalar complex in their vertebrate successors (Loonen & Ivanova, 2016). 
The amygdalar complex is known to be relevant for allowing the organism to select and attend sensory 
stimuli crucial to trigger reward-seeking and misery-fleeing behaviours in vertebrates (Loonen & Ivanova, 
2016). But have the lamprey these capacities without a differentiated amygdala? The answer seems to be 
affirmative. Lamprey present aversive and appetitive stimuli-related behaviour (Pietrzakowski et al., 2013; 
Imre et al., 2016) as well as crucial structures to salient stimuli coding: its optic tectum operates on its 
own to develop gaze reorientation commands through multisensory stimuli computation (Kardamarkis et 
al., 2016), and there are crucial hallmarks of attention-related pathways in lamprey’s tectum, like direct 
dopaminergic projections that encode specifically for saliency  (Pérez-Fernández et al., 2017).  
 In addition, the modern jawless fishes present a small but well-developed dorsal thalamus which 
connects the tectum with the optic tract and the caudal parts of the pallium (Loonen & Ivanova, 2016), 
this last one related to the hippocampal primordium and subhippocampal lobe (Loonen & Ivanova, 2016), 
areas linked to spatial memory (Rodríguez et al., 2002). Last but not least, the three-layered structure of 
the mammalian cortex, historically conceived to be based in the reptilian cortex has been found in the 
lateral pallium of the lamprey, with GABAergic interneurons, glutamatergic cells and projections similar 
to the mammal brain (Suryanarayana et al., 2017): a lamprey area that is known to produce and mediate 
goal-directed behaviours and highly interconnected with the thalamus (Suryanarayana et al., 2017). 
Moreover, the high interconnectivity between areas in lamprey has been reported recently by experts on 
the field. Concretely, we can find reciprocal signalling between the optic tectum, the pretectum, the 
thalamus, the pallium and the basal ganglia of the lamprey fishes (Suzuki & Grillner, 2018). 
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4.1.3. Neural spatiotemporal synchronization 
A recent study demonstrated the existence of previously theoretically hypothesized inhibitory circuits in 
the modern lamprey that allows the coherent integration of the high amount of different environmental 
stimuli (Kardamakis et al., 2016). According to the study, the tectal GABAergic system of the lamprey fishes 
that regulates the excitatory visual and electrosensory input integration is provided by a net of short and 
long-range inhibitory connections across the optic tectum (Kardamakis et al., 2016). These neural 
pathways allow constantly recruited inhibition triggered by the two types of the sensory stimulus (that 
are exciting the GABAergic system at the same time); a process that reset continuously the active areas 
of the system to enable the entrance and codification of new set of stimuli (Kardamakis et al., 2016), thus 
generating a constant flow of information (Kardamakis et al., 2016). Remarkably, the study also evidence 
that the optic tectum of the lamprey fishes is spatiotopic organized in columns with output neurons 
receiving retinal excitation from the same quadrant (Kardamakis et al., 2016).  
 This presented inhibitory system is similar to the system proposed by the NGW model during the 
ignitions. Moreover, this is only an example through which spatiotemporal synchronization of the neural 
networks can be inferred. 
 
4.2. Testing lamprey sensory consciousness through differential criteria 
To carry out with the comparison we have collected different criteria across scientific disciplines and 
authors. We have extracted 11 variables from the scientific literature consulted (within a research based 
on the words “(Consciousness)” AND “criteria” and “(Consciousness)” AND “animal”), which has been 
based only on neuroscientific studies or reviews. Some variables have been merged because of its similar 
explanatory potential; coincident or similar criteria between studies are reflected in the ‘References’ 
column of Table 1. 
 The variety between criteria has been ensured by the inclusion of variables from different fields 
related with neuroscience: Clinical criteria in humans with MCS (Coleman et al., 2002); Cognitive sciences 
(O’regan, 2005); Cephalopod studies (Mather, 2007); Predictive coding studies (Hohwy, 2012; Panichello 
et al., 2013; Seth et al., 2012; Strauss et al., 2015); a European Food Safety Authority report (Neindre et 
al., 2017) and other relevant studies based on non-human consciousness (Pennartz et al., 2019). Some 
variables have been found redundant with our model, and the rest of them have shown the following 
fitness: 
 
• Var 1. Anticipatory behaviour. Describes the capacity of an animal to predict events in the future. 
The trait can be traced from insects to primates and humans, considering the neurobiological 
presence of internal timing mechanisms that allow the animal fitness in a “timescale from seconds to 
seasons” (Krebs et al., 2017). It is directly related to attentional mechanisms, operant conditioning, 
zeitgebers and stimuli processing. 
 
• Var 2. Predictive coding & Top-Down processing. Describes the presence of neural top-down 
pathways, in the opposite direction of the sensory entrance pathways, with the capacity to generate 
predictive models of the environment and reduce the requirements of the sensory processors, which 
adopts a role of error informers. The brain includes pathways that generate expectations from the 
previous sensory input, and compare this top-down expectation with the actual sensory input. This 
results in a cascade of constant and simultaneous predictions and error corrections that tends to an 
error minimization (Hohwy, 2012). Thus the final source of the sensory experience is not the bottom-
up entrance signals but the top-down processing through previous sensory information (Hohwy, 2012; 
Panichello et al., 2013; Seth et al., 2012; Strauss et al., 2015).  
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The prediction generator process needs the integration of different sensory stimuli to build 
environmental hypothesis (maps, images) and provide a model to explain the attentional responses 
of an organism (see Hohwy, 2012). This can be reached only across a generative system with strong 
representative power of the physical and chemical environment of the individual.  
 In lampreys, we cannot find direct evidence of perceptive processing, but we can find pathways 
compatible with the idea. Concretely, the pallium of the lamprey, which has been found to be three-
layered on its medial zone, send efferences directly to the optic tectum and the pretectum, the first 
sensory entrances on the visual system of the animal. The pallium also maintains reciprocal 
connectivity with the thalamus, that is reciprocally connected with the optic tectum at the same time 
(Suzuki & Grillner, 2018).  
 
• Var 3. Visuospatial behaviour. Despite there is no explicit evidence of consciousness directly related 
with the navigation behaviour of an organism using visual data (Pennartz et al., 2019), the behaviour 
of an animal, highly correlated with its environmental cues (collected through distant sensors) can be 
an indicator of the existence of situational perceptive maps (Pennartz et al., 2019). Moreover, the 
behaviour based on the concept of object permanence becomes strong evidence of perceptual images 
and representations from the organism (Pennartz et al., 2019). This is used by Pennartz as criteria for 
defending the existence of sensory consciousness at least in mammals and birds (Pennartz et al., 
2019). In parallel, recently has been demonstrated the object permanence behaviour in four species 
of fishes (Sovrano et al., 2018). Again, there is a lack of evidence related directly with lamprey, but 
the presence of this trait in other fishes is remarkable. The visuospatial behaviour is used in clinical 
studies to infer Minimally Conscious State in patients with Disorders of Consciousness (Coleman et 
al., 2002). 
Another criterion used by Pennartz to infer consciousness is the presence of illusions and multistable 
perceptions, that indicates an active role of the brain in constructing models of the environment 
instead of reacting to simple stimuli entrances (Pennartz et al., 2019). Remarkably, this trait has also 
been recently proven in zebrafish and guppy (Gori et al., 2014), indicating that it is not a cortex-based 
characteristic. 
 
• Var 4. Communicating system. In clinical studies, the capacity to minimally communicate is 
considered a criterion to infer MCS in a patient with DoC (Coleman et al., 2002). In the field of non-
human animal consciousness, the capacity of communicating has been considered as a feature of 
conscious organisms, and concretely, has been considered a feature that supports the attribution of 
consciousness in cephalopods (Mather, 2007). This allows us to consider communication as a simple 
interchange of information between organisms. In that way, the lamprey shows a high conspecific 
chemical interaction that is conserved across vertebrate taxonomy; the pheromonal communication 
system (Buchinger et al., 2019). The olfactory bulb in lamprey is chemotopic organized and responds 
to pheromonal stimuli through sensory olfactory neurons: this is, its communicating system is 
supported by perceptual odorant maps (Green et al., 2017). 
 
• Var 5. Metacognitive performance. Despite historically being considered a human capacity, during 
the last years, metacognition has been studied in mammals and birds as the capacity of the individual 
to be aware of its own uncertainty (Neindre et al., 2017; Pennartz et al., 2019). Under this specific 
definition, metacognition has been found even in honeybees (Apis mellifera) (Perry & Barron, 2013), 
that shown avoiding behaviours in a reward/punishment task when they lack the information to solve 
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the problem (Perry & Barron, 2013). Again, there is a lack of studies in lamprey, although the presence 
of the trait in honeybees suggests its extension in the animal kingdom. 
 
• Var 6. Sleep/wake activity. This criterion is shared between human clinical studies (Coleman et al., 
2002), mammals and bird studies (Neindre et al., 2017) and non-vertebrate studies (Mather, 2007). 
The sleeping capacity of an organism allows us to specify moments in which probably is unconscious, 
and moments in which probably it is conscious. Despite we think this can be a tricky hallmark, lamprey 
presents circadian locomotor rhythms with long periods of minimal locomotor activity (Zvezdin et al., 
2019) and a specific brain structure, the cerebellar rhombic lip, highly conserved across species, 
including humans, and related with it. Despite we have not found studies about the possibility of REM 
and NREM phases in lamprey, the behavioural criteria used in non-vertebrate consciousness studies 
matches with the provided data. 
 
Table 1. Differential observable criteria to infer consciousness in human and non-human animals 
Variable   Variable type                             Fitness                     References 








Neindre et al., 2017 
 
(2) Rostral-to-caudal processing after caudal-
to-rostral sensory pathways / Predictive 









Neindre et al., 2017 
Strauss et al., 2015 
Seth et al., 2012 
Panichello et al., 2013 
Hohwy, 2012 









Pennartz et al., 2019 
Coleman et al., 2002 









Coleman et al., 2002 









Pennartz et al., 2019 
Neindre et al., 2017 
(6) Sleep/wake activity 
 
 




Neindre et al., 2017 
Mather, 2007 
Coleman et al., 2002 
(7) Thalamocortical system or functional 






Pennartz et al., 2019 
Neindre et al., 2017 
Mather, 2007 
(8) Corporality / Self-location in space  




O’regan et al., 2005 
Coleman et al., 2002 
(9) Goal-directed behaviour with Arousal and 
Pleasure/Displeasure responses 
 
BH / NB 
 
Redundant 
Pennartz et al., 2019 
Neindre et al., 2017 
Coleman et al., 2002 
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Neindre et al., 2017 
O’regan et al., 2005 
 
(11) Memory and Learning 
 
 
BH / NB 
 
Redundant 
Pennartz et al., 2019 
Neindre et al., 2017 
Mather, 2007 
BH: Behavioural; NB: Neurobiological; Fitness: Potential of our vertebrate model to sustain the presented variables 
  
4.3. Testing INMC and lamprey fitness with human consciousness criteria 
The final test provided us with 10 variables considered indispensable features for consciousness in 
humans. As it is presented in Table 2, it is possible to propose homologous characteristics with similar 
functionalities in lamprey, despite this is an inferential exercise. More data in both directions is needed to 
prove the similarities between brains. By the time, all that can be ensured is the considerable possibility 
of lamprey to present consciousness. 
 
Table 2. Crucial features for consciousness in humans and homologous features in lamprey  
Indispensable human brain feature Variable Lamprey homologous References 
(1) High-order associative areas 𝑃𝑒𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑡 
 
Three-layered lateral pallium [h] Laureys, 2005 
[v] Suryanarayana et al., 2017 
(2) Long-range synchronization Γ Long-range synchronization [h] Wenzel et al., 2018 
[v] Massarelli et al., 2016 
(3) Positive and negative default mode network 
(DMN) 
Π Interconnected thalamus and 
pallium, telencephalon 
[h] Perri et al., 2016 
[v] Suryanarayana et al., 2017 
(4) Dorsal attention network (DAT) and temporal 
connections to DMN 
Π Midbrain, optic tectum, 
pallium 
[h] Huang et al., 2020 
[v] Robertson et al., 2006 
(5) Top-Down sensory modulation pathways 𝑃𝑒𝑟  Top-Down sensory 
modulation pathways 
[h] Sikkens et al., 2019 
[v] Sovrano et al., 2018 
(6) Functional connectivity patterns 𝐾, 𝑃𝑒𝑟 Interconnected OT, PT, TH, 
PA, BG 
[h] Lee et al., 2017 
[v] Suzuki & Grillner, 2018 
(7) Reticular Activating System Π Hindbrain, midbrain [h] Garcia-Rill et al., 2013 
[v] Wannier et al., 1998 * 
(8) Thalamocortical circuits 𝑃𝑒𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑡 Interconnected thalamus and 
pallium 
[h] Redinbaugh et al., 2020 
[v] Suryanarayana et al., 2017 
(9) Posterior cingulate cortex and precuneus 𝑃𝑒𝑟, 𝐼𝑛𝑡 Telencephalon [h] Vogt & Laureys, 2005 
[v] Suryanarayana et al., 2017 
(10) Habenula 𝐼𝑛𝑡, 𝑉𝑎𝑙 Habenula [h] Gelegen et al., 2018 
[v] Yáñez & Anadon, 1994 
[h] human data. [v] lamprey/other fishes data. OT: optic tectum; PT: Pretectum; TH: thalamus; PA: Pallium; BG: Basal ganglia.  
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5. DISCUSSION            
5.1. Hypothesis refutation 
5.1.1. Null Hypothesis: Consciousness is an emergent property 
Thanks to the structure of the INCM, that entails the proposal of three scientific theoretical frameworks 
related with consciousness, the resulting mathematical expression, and the results of our research, we 
can sustain that consciousness is the verbal construct that represents 𝐾(∆𝑡𝛽) = 𝐾(𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼), Π) ∙ Γ. 
Considering consciousness as an emergent property of the brain’s processes would imply strange 
relationships like the following: 
Φ = Φ(𝐾(∆𝑡𝛽), 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼), Π) ∙ Γ 
And although it can be conceived, it implies the entrance of unknown variables to the formula. In this 
example, Φ  is an abstract and uncertain component: the emergent result of a process. To resolve its 
vague definition, some authors are invoking new physical properties and proposing new forms of dualism 
(Feinberg & Mallatt, 2019). As it happened with the verbal construct of “life”, that it can be reduced to a 
conjunct of specific chemical processes, we defend that consciousness does not need more than conjuncts 
of specific biological processes to be explained: 
𝐾(∆𝑡𝛽) = 𝐾(𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼), Π) ∙ Γ 
While we cannot refute the possibility of consciousness as an emergent property, we find that our model 
is endowed with some valuable characteristics that by the moment, the emergentist proposals does not 
have. This is, our model is simpler: described through the 3+1 dimensions, raised in the actual physical, 
chemical and biological knowledge; and is falsifiable: every component of the model can be put under 
test. 
5.1.2. First Hypothesis: Consciousness is a process that brain does 
Thus, we first conclude that, considering the actual evidence, the most parsimonious approach is to accept 
consciousness as a process until proven otherwise. Being scientifically unnecessary to consider 
consciousness as an emergent feature, we propose that the effort must be done in continuing building 
evidence and searching for data related with the main components of the conscious experience: data that 
have the potential to strengthen or refute the actual hypothesis, instead of trying to fit the emergent 
proposals in a process that does not require it to be explained. 
 
5.1.3. Second Hypothesis: Consciousness is at least a vertebrate function 
The phylogenetic situation of the lamprey has been key to build a response to the last hypothesis. To 
prove its consciousness is to prove the possible consciousness of at least every vertebrate of the animal 
kingdom. But, although our results are reinforcing the proposal of Feinberg and Mallatt, we cannot 
establish definitive conclusions. What we can establish, is that, as it can be observed in Figure 4 (where 
we can infer every element of the INMC), there are general hallmarks and patterns of brain connectivity 
in lamprey that matches with the existence of perceptual structures and the temporal organization of the 
inputs. Considering the evidence that reveals the presence of illusions in fishes (therefore, top-down 
perceptual processes) and the multisensory convergence of different stimuli in lamprey (thus the 
necessity of organize the stimuli and interpret them), it is highly reasonable to consider the possibility of 
its sensory consciousness. 
Thus, again, we propose that the more parsimonious approach to this question, as well as the more 
ethical, is to consider until proven otherwise that the lamprey fishes present evidence of consciousness. 
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 Figure 4. Scheme of the visual system of the lamprey with electrosensory participation from the octavolateral area 
 
 
5.2. The Nature of Consciousness 
What consciousness really is? And Where can we find it? These two starting answers have brought us to 
this final point. We defended through evidence our prototype of the INMC, therefore, we provided 
support to the postulates of the Neurobiological Naturalism, the Two-Stage Model and the Neuronal 
Global Workspace, and we established a mathematical skeleton of related variables through which 
consciousness can be explained. It seems that finally, consciousness is the fruit of a process shaped by 
evolution to deal with the multiplicity of sensory data: a multiple and unified receptor field that only 
accepts the significant and previously processed data. 
To conclude this work, we introduce a final concept: the INMC Loop. This is, consciousness can be 
expressed as the full process of global perception in a specific time-window. But imagine an isolated 
organism that accomplishes all the structural and process requisites for consciousness that INCM 
established, in a timeframe of 500 ms, for example. Imagine, also, that this organism started its existence 
at the moment. The significance of the stimuli during the first 500 ms of its life will be at least, inferior to 
the significance of the last conscious percept of its life. This is, the organism will learn and will store 
information that will help it to classify, signify and provide valences to the components of its perception 
through its interaction with the environment along its life. Thus, consciousness is not only the 
encapsulated process inside this 500 ms but a continuous process of loops that include the two moments 
of perception. Every actual perception is the result of the anterior perceptual moment with the interaction 
of the new processed stimuli, as well as the collected memories and learnings established previously, that 
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 Figure 5. INMC Loop 
 
 
As other models propose, the perceptual patterns modulate the sensory pathways in a top-down way. 
This is highly compatible with the idea of prediction processing and it can also be observed in the 
connectivity of lampreys, where the pallium sends efferences to the optic tectum (see Figure 4). 
 
5.2.1. The Ship of Theseus and the Philosophical Zombie 
The philosophical implications of the neurobiological eliminatory approaches of the conscious experience 
are diverse. David Chalmers used in his book “The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory” 
the concept of p-zombie to defend his property dualism through the illustration of a possible scenario 
where a human can be acting as a human without conscious experience (Chalmers, 2007; Cavanna & Nani, 
2014). Our response to this movement is that the p-zombie is a fallacy originated in the misunderstanding 
of the neurobiological functions of the brains. A human cannot act as a human without perceptions: this 
is, without a system that contextualize the body, the environment and the significations of the integrated 
stimuli. This capacities, combined with highly elaborated functions in humans, as the verbal reporting 
capacity or the self-recognition, implies the conviction that what is perceived is different from the system 
that is perceiving, but our conclusion is that the processes of the system itself are what is perceived, and 
its relation with the external physical or chemical reality is simply a correspondence mediated by the 
receptors. 
 Thus, there is no necessity to explain qualia or the Hard Problem, because they are convictions, 
resulting thoughts of a system prepared through evolution to build its own representation of the world, 
inaccessible in other ways. The deep feeling of agency and the situatedness of the body in the 
environment are also results of neurobiological functionalities. While our brain is not the same thing in 
every moment, because its physical, chemical and biological dynamics, our sensation of continuity is 
provided by the long-term memories (our history) and the short-term memories (our actual context). We 
are embodied, isolated but constantly changing biological systems, and what really remains in us is the 
capacity of evoke in the present moment, experiences of the system that we were a second ago, or a year 
ago; in humans, remains the projection of us through our history, and the projection about us in the future 
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(but the sensory consciousness itself could only need the short-term memory to generate context to the 
organism). Therefore, the qualia, or the Hard Problem, does not imply different qualities of the matter: 
they do not need to exist. The only that needs to exist is the capacity of the system to convince itself about 
the reality that is building. This is, the unique reality that can exist by a perceptive system is the perceived 
reality, trapped in an inescapable continuous process of cause-effect. 
 At the moment that we conclude that there is nothing essential or permanent in us but the 
convincement of the system about its agency, that is also a functionality based on the neural architecture 
and processes, we can suggest that consciousness could hypothetically be replicated, considering that a 
replicated system will share all the same convincements. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, through this work we explored an option to build scientific knowledge about consciousness. 
Despite the objectives of the work are not fully accomplished because of the nature of the problem that 
we are approaching, we consider that we got as close as we could, and the most important, we offered 
theoretical support to great neuroscientific frameworks as the Neurobiological Naturalism or the Two-
Stage Model. 
 Regarding the INMC, we deal with our own mathematical limitations and the lack of specificity, 
but we consider that the model could serve as a starting point to develop programming experiments, 
since it offers conjuncts which parts can be situated in a 3D space and in a specific timeframe, as well as 
the vagueness of the functions that we propose opens the door to a real mathematical and computational 
development. Thus, we are satisfied to have the opportunity to at least propose a first template of 
relationships that invites the scientific reasoning and participation. 
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Rodrıǵuez F., López, J., Vargas, J., Broglio, C., Gómez, Y., & Salas, C. 
(2002). Spatial memory and hippocampal pallium through 
vertebrate evolution: insights from reptiles and teleost fish. Brain 
Research Bulletin, 57(3-4), 499–503. doi: 10.1016/s0361-
9230(01)00682-7 
Popper, K. R., & Freed, J. (1959). The Logic of scientific discovery: 
Karl R. Popper. Hutchinson. 
 
Scorzato, L. (2012). On the role of simplicity in science. Synthese, 
190(14), 2867-2895. doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0101-3 
Seth, A. K., Suzuki, K., & Critchley, H. D. (2012). An Interoceptive 
Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00395 
Sikkens, T., Bosman, C. A., & Olcese, U. (2019). The Role of Top-
Down Modulation in Shaping Sensory Processing Across Brain 
States: Implications for Consciousness. Frontiers in Systems 
Neuroscience, 13. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2019.00031 
 
Sober, E. (1975). Simplicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Sovrano, V. A., Baratti, G., & Potrich, D. (2018). A Detour Task in 
Four Species of Fishes. Frontiers in Psychology, 9. doi: 
10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02341 
Development of a first proposal on the INMC  Bachelor’s Degree Final Thesis 





Strauss, M., Sitt, J. D., King, J.-R., Elbaz, M., Azizi, L., Buiatti, M., … 
Dehaene, S. (2015). Disruption of hierarchical predictive coding 
during sleep. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 
112(11). doi: 10.1073/pnas.1501026112 
Suryanarayana, S. M., Robertson, B. M., Wallén, P. M., & Grillner, 
S. M. (2017). The Lamprey Pallium Provides a Blueprint of the 
Mammalian Layered Cortex. Current Biology, 27(21). doi: 
10.1016/j.cub.2017.09.034 
Suzuki, D. G., & Grillner, S. (2018). The stepwise development of 
the lamprey visual system and its evolutionary implications. 
Biological Reviews, 93(3), 1461–1477. doi: 10.1111/brv.12403 
Thagard, P. (1988). Computational philosophy of science. MIT 
Press. 
Vogt, B. A., & Laureys, S. (2005). Posterior cingulate, precuneal and 
retrosplenial cortices: cytology and components of the neural 
network correlates of consciousness. Progress in Brain Research. 
The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and 
Neuropathology, 205–217. doi: 10.1016/s0079-6123(05)50015-3 
Walsh, D. (1979). Occam’s Razor: A Principle of Intellectual 
Elegance. American Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 241-244. 
Wannier, T., Deliagina, T. G., Orlovsky, G. N., & Grillner, S. (1998). 
Differential Effects of the Reticulospinal System on Locomotion in 
Lamprey. Journal of Neurophysiology, 80(1), 103–112. doi: 
10.1152/jn.1998.80.1.103 
Wenzel, M., Han, S., Smith, E. H., Hoel, E., Greger, B., House, P. A., 
& Yuste, R. (2018). Reduced repertoire of cortical microstates and 
neuronal ensembles in medically-induced loss of consciousness. 
BioRxiv Preprint. doi: 10.1101/358168 
Yañez, J., & Anadon, R. (1994). Afferent and efferent connections 
of the habenula in the larval sea lamprey (Petromyzon marinus L.): 
An experimental study. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 345(1), 
148–160. doi: 10.1002/cne.903450112 
Yuan, T., York, J. R., & Mccauley, D. W. (2020). Neural crest and 
placode roles in formation and patterning of cranial sensory ganglia 
in lamprey. Genesis. doi: 10.1002/dvg.23356 
Zecca, A., Dyballa, S., Voltes, A., Bradley, R., & Pujades, C. (2015). 
The Order and Place of Neuronal Differentiation Establish the 
Topography of Sensory Projections and the Entry Points within the 
Hindbrain. Journal of Neuroscience, 35(19), 7475–7486. doi: 
10.1523/jneurosci.3743-14.2015 
Zvezdin, A. O., Pavlov, D. S., Kucheryavyy, A. V., & Tsimbalov, I. A. 
(2019). Circadian Rhythms and Locomotor Activity of Smolts of the 
European River Lamprey Lampetra fluviatilis (L.). Doklady Biological 
Sciences, 484(1), 16–18. doi: 10.1134/s0012496619010034 
 
 
          
8.1. List of boxes, figures and tables 
Box 1. Establishment of the central objectives                     p.3 
Box 2. Neurobiological Naturalism Thesis                 p.4-5 
Box 3. Two-Stage Model                      p.6 
Box 4. Neuronal Global Workspace Main Components                   p.7 
Box 5. Working Hypothesis of the INMC                     p.7 
Box 6. Foundational Axioms of the INMC                    p.9 
Box 7. Structural Variables of the INMC                  p.10 
Box 8. Time Window                    p.10 
Box 9. Externally Triggered Processes                   p.11 
Box 10. Internally Triggered Processes                   p.11 
Box 11. Spatiotemporal Synchronization                  p.11 
Box 12. Perceptive Patterns                    p.11 
 
Figure 1. Variable relationship between referential theoretical frameworks and the INMC              p.8 
Figure 2. Abstract example of the processes previous to perception through the INMC             p.12 
Figure 3. Abstract example of the resulting process of perception through the INMC              p.12 
Figure 4. Scheme of the visual system of the lamprey with electrosensory participation from the octavolateral area          p.19 
Figure 5. INMC Loop                   p.20 
 
Table 1. Differential observable criteria to infer consciousness in humans and non-humans animals    p. 16-17 
Table 2. Crucial features for consciousness in humans and homologous features in lamprey            p.17 
 
 
Development of a first proposal on the INMC  Bachelor’s Degree Final Thesis 
























Dream, reality… The world’s fallacy 









Development of a first proposal on the INMC  Bachelor’s Degree Final Thesis 





8.1 Extended development of the Integrative Neurobiological Model of Consciousness 
 
By Marçal Castán Sogas, bachelor’s degree in Psychology, Autonomous University of Barcelona. | Special contribution from Marta 
Alcalde Herraiz from the bachelor’s degree in Physical Engineering at the Polytechnic University of Catalonia. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
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VARIABLE DEVELOPMENT 
1. Structural variables 
The central nervous system is a tridimensional system with neural hierarchical organizations: 
pathways, nodes and reticular structures of neurons with different capabilities of coding, processing 
and representing information. The structural variables refer to the organization of neurons in space, 
its synapses, its extension in a tridimensional plane and its type. For this reason, the structural 
variables determine the potential of the system to be conscious, but not determines consciousness 
itself. Despite the structure can reflect a chemical or physical compatibility between secreted 
neurotransmitters and membrane ligands, or a spatiotemporal disposition that can facilitate the fast 
communication between two neurons and isolate other cells, note that this variable does not refer 
directly to the time-specific neural chemoelectrical activity. 
 
1.1. Operationalization 
Single neuron location 
The tridimensional interconnected structure of our modelled conscious brain stablishes its 
minimal unit in neurons (𝑢𝑖) where 𝑖 ∈ ℕ and classifies arbitrarily but permanently each neuron. 
At the same time, each neuron is situated in a specific point of the tridimensional space that takes 
x, y and z values. Thus, neurons can take the form: 𝑢𝑖  (𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧), where each coordinate is expressed 
in µm; where 0 is the exact center of each axis and the µm value indicates the deviation in 
micrometers of the point 𝑢𝑖  from the center of the respective axis. For example: 
 
𝑢101.758(7.855, 3.601, 140.050) 
𝑢32.000(523, −15.890, −75.602) 
 Synapsis 
The system stablished between two neurons through synapsis can be considered the function 
that relates both neurons in space. Thus, synapsis (𝑠𝑛), where 𝑛 ∈ ℕ, can be physically modelled 
by the following expression: 
𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠(𝑢𝑖1(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗, 𝑧𝑗), 𝑢𝑖2(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗, 𝑧𝑗))  
 
 Note that 𝑖1 ≠ 𝑖2. While 𝑖1 stablishes the presynaptic neuron, 𝑖2 refers to the postsynaptic one. 
The information that contains the function allow us to stablish two interrelated points in the space 
and a preestablished direction of this relation.  
For example: 
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𝑠1 = 𝑠(𝑢101.758(7.855, 3.601, 140.050), 𝑢32.000(523, −15.890, −75.602))  
 
By the moment, 𝑠1 indicates that neuron 101.758, physically placed, is synapsed with neuron 
32.000, also physically placed, and that 101.758 is the presynaptic neuron and 32.000 the 
postsynaptic one. 
 
Neural network structure 
Any function composition that includes more than one 𝑠 can be conceived as a neural network 
(𝜔), where 𝑘 ∈ ℕ, which takes the following form: 
 
𝜔𝑘 = ℎ(𝑠1 , 𝑠2 … 𝑠𝑛) 
  
Where, for example, the simplest structure, a spatial-stablished loop between two neurons, can 
be expressed by the following functions: 
𝜔1 = ℎ(𝑠1 , 𝑠2) 
Where 𝑠1 = 𝑠(𝑢101.758(7.855, 3.601, 140.050), 𝑢32.000(523, −15.890, −75.602)) 
Where 𝑠2 = 𝑠(𝑢32.000(523, −15.890, −75.602), 𝑢101.758(7.855, 3.601, 140.050)) 
 
Each 𝜔 represents a functional system. This is, it can contain nets of neurons with specific 
functionalities. Note that a neuron can be a part of different nets. And, in addition, note that this 
allows us to represent hierarchical structures with cumulative functionalities. In the following 
example, 𝜔1 could represent an inhibitory net, as well as 𝜔2 an excitatory one, and 𝜔3 a simple 
net that can determine the final state of a single neuron (see Fig.1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Abstraction of a simple nested hierarchical network 
 
The entire system composed by 𝜔1, 𝜔2 and 𝜔3 can be expressed as 𝜔4 = {𝜔1, 𝜔2, 𝜔3} or also 
𝜔4 = ℎ(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠3 … 𝑠𝑛) where in this specific example 𝑛 = 15. 𝜔4 can be classified, for example, 
as an ON/OFF system composed by an inhibitory structure, an excitatory structure and an 
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The global structure reflects all the necessary circuits for an organism to be sensory conscious in 
the tridimensional space, including every neuron and every directed connection of the physical 
system. Thus, the full connectome needed by an organism to be conscious is expressed by: 
 
Π = {𝜔1, 𝜔2 … 𝜔𝑘} 
 
This stablishes an abstract representation of the necessary neural architecture, but again, not 
reflects any chemical or electrical activity; only the structural points and the preestablished cause-
effect relationships in space. 
 
Finally, our connectome can be conceived as the sum of every single minimal functional network, 
or the sum of large networks (build on minimal functional networks) with specific and crucial 
functions to build conscious perceptions. Thus: 
 
Π = {𝜔1, 𝜔2 … 𝜔𝑘} = {𝑇𝑜𝑝, 𝐼𝑛𝑡, 𝑉𝑎𝑙, 𝑆𝑎𝑙, 𝑀𝑒𝑚, 𝑃𝑒𝑟} 
 
1.2. Topographic sensory structures with single-sense integration 
The first crucial function of a sensory conscious organism is to stablish representations of what is 
happening into the body and in the environment. To do that, the system maintains a cause-effect 
concordance between receptors and single neurons. The first topographic neural maps will be a 
single physical correspondence between neurons and receptors through synapsis, and 
progressively, the combined information from different receptors will be merged across layers to 
put in relation the crude data. 
 
Consider the following example: a simple visual circuit with 4 neural entrances 𝑢1, 𝑢2, 𝑢3 and 𝑢4. 
This circuit needs to provide an output that determines the existence of a single visual point or 
the existence of a line. First, we will need to stablish a correspondence between the input source 
and a neuron. This will imply a layer where there are neurons which activity correlate ≈ 1 with 
their bounded receptor, but every neuron is isolated from the effects of the other receptors. With 
the crude data conserved and entered to the system, it can start a process of integration. In our 
abstract example, the topographic layer that corresponds to the neural entrances (see Fig 2.) will 
stablish synapses with all the neurons required to determine the position of the dot; this is, the 
activity of the neurons in the very previous layer will explain a big part of the variability of the 
integrative layers. In figure 2, the activity of 𝑢8 will depend mostly on the activity of 𝑢4 but the 
activity of 𝑢9 will depend on the activity of all the previous neurons. Note that correlation can be 
obtained by the Pearson’s Coefficient formula applied to a specific sample of electrochemical 
activity between two neurons in a specific time: 
 
𝑟𝑥𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑥, 𝑦) =
𝑛 ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑦𝑖 − ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ∑ 𝑦𝑖
√∑ 𝑥𝑖
2 − (∑ 𝑥𝑖)2 √𝑛 ∑ 𝑦1






If applied to our notation, where the specific electrochemical response activity of a neuron can 
be conceived as 𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡, where 𝑖 corresponds to the number that classifies the neuron in space, 
and considering an hypothetically infinite sample of performances over time, we can determine: 
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𝑟𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑥,𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑥 , 𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑦) 
 
Thus, a linkage between two neurons can be expressed as physical or as correlational: 
 
𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠(𝑢𝑖𝑥(𝑥𝑗, 𝑦𝑗 , 𝑧𝑗), 𝑢𝑖𝑦(𝑥𝑗 , 𝑦𝑗, 𝑧𝑗)) 
𝑟𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑥,𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑦 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑥 , 𝑢𝑖𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑦) 
  
Returning to the example, we provided an abstraction of how can be conceived the architecture 
of the topographic maps. It is important to consider that the topography is the first step to encode 
specific stimuli, and progressively, through the hierarchical levels of the single-sense processor, 
the information will be merged to increase its significance. 
Figure 2. Abstract example of a minimal sensory integration through topographic single-sense map 
 
Concluding the section, the topographic structures with single-sense integrative pathways (𝑇𝑜𝑝) 
will be considered all the neural network structures (𝜔) where the activity of every neuron of its 
architecture depends on the activity of a neuron directly linked to a specific receptor, without 
considering the correlative relations with neurons linked to other senses: 𝑇𝑜𝑝 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑖 … 𝜔𝑙) 
 
1.3. Multisensory integration structures 
Unlike the previous one, the architecture that allows the integration of multisensory data can also 
be described as the neural systems that hierarchically integrates and processes combined 
information of different senses through pathways with specific encoding functionalities. Thus, the 
multisensory structures of the brain are these structures with neurons where its behavioral 
variability depends at least on the variability of two types of receptors from different senses. 
 
Consider the following example: as well as the previous presented structure, we have a similar 
one that allows us to position the own body in a space of 4 zones (see Fig.3). If we combine the 
visual data that indicates where the point is, and the proprioceptive data, that indicates where 
the body is, we can position one in relation to the other. Consider that 𝑢1 have been stimulated 
and 𝑢2, 𝑢3 and 𝑢4 not, and consider that 𝑢13 have been stimulated and 𝑢14, 𝑢15 and 𝑢16 have 
not. First, 𝑢1 will activate 𝑢5, that at the same time will activate 𝑢9, while 𝑢10, 𝑢11 and 𝑢12 are 
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inactive. In parallel, consider that 𝑢13, from another sensorial organ, is stimulated. 𝑢13 will 
activate 𝑢17, that will activate 𝑢21 while 𝑢22, 𝑢23 and 𝑢24 will be inactive. Four neurons in a 
multisensory layer encode the meaning “I am at zone 1” so the four neurons will receive stimuli 
from 𝑢21. At the same time, each of the four neurons receive one specific input from the visual 
sense. Concretely, 𝑢9 have synapsis with 𝑢25 inside this complex. The reception of both stimuli 
will activate a neuron that encodes the convergence between the dot and the body at the same 
zone. 
Figure 2. Abstract example of a minimal multisensory integration between two type of senses 
 
Thus, we can define the multisensory architecture of the brain (𝐼𝑛𝑡) as the circuitry (𝜔) which 
the variability of the neuron’s behaviour is explained by the effects of at least two different inputs 
providing from two different senses or more, with highly integrative layers where the variability 
of the behavior of its neurons can be explained by many inputs from many senses: 𝐼𝑛𝑡 =
𝑓(𝜔𝑟 … 𝜔𝑠) 
 
1.4. Valence coding structures, Salience coding structures, Memory structures 
A sensory stimulus, although highly integrated, cannot be representative to an organism without 
a layer of processing that indicates its peril, its neutrality or its benefit. This classification allows 
the organism “fight or flight” behaviors, “wait and see” behaviors or approach behaviors in front 
of the stimuli. Moreover, this classification must grant the system the capacity to recognize the 
stimuli with major consequences in each sequence of perception, that will include a lot of 
different processed data. To discern between stimuli and constantly adjust the behavior in front 
of them, the organism must keep previous classifications over time. Note that we have described 
abstract concepts classified by psychology as appetition and aversion, attention and memory, but 
highly operable when observed through neural functions and the lens of evolution. Note that the 
classificatory functions of the neurons, its systematic capacity to discern relevant stimuli and its 
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capacity to store information proceed directly from its cellular qualities: its maintenance over 
time, but characterized by a plastic capacity of stablishing new synapsis, discard unused pathways 
and strengthen the relevant ones. Although by the moment it’s hard to define the specific 
qualities of the networks with these functionalities, we can find neurobiological hallmarks and 
behavioral evidences of this capacities that explains the ability to the system to attribute valences 
to the stimuli, discern the most determinant stimuli between a set of many others, and store 
information to adapt behavior in future situations. Thus: 𝑉𝑎𝑙, 𝑆𝑎𝑙, 𝑀𝑒𝑚 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑚 … 𝜔𝑛) where 
𝑉𝑎𝑙 represents the neural architecture that allows the valence coding, 𝑆𝑎𝑙 stands for salience 
coding architectures and 𝑀𝑒𝑚 for mnemonic specific networks. Note that these are three 
structures that are presented together because its mutually dependence during a percept.  
 
Finally, as Feinberg and Mallatt suggested (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2017), we propose that every 
organism that can be operantly conditioned is provided with these functional capacities with high 
implications on sensory consciousness. 
 
1.5. Perception coding structures 
The discovery of the temporal-discrete performance of conscious perception, but the knowledge 
that their frameworks capture encoded all the quasi-continuous integrated data, raises the 
necessity of the existence of a system with the capacity to put in relation all the highly integrated 
and processed data in a specific moment. This is, the pre-perceptual sensory information needs 
to be held until is organized, encoded and sent to the perceptual structures. The Two Step model 
explains that the duration of a conscious precept and the temporal resolution of the senses are 
different issues (Herzog et al., 2016), so, the necessity of a widespread architecture that encodes 
and represents the final global sensory perception is evident. 
 
The specific structures involved in this process are vaguely understood by the time, since it must 
be a reticular widespread net that entangles many associative areas in large brain connections, 
but the specific process of encoding perceptions through these architectures is unknown, but 
present, since we know that, for example, we have areas involved in the time or motion 
perception that differs from the simple juxtaposition of inputs in a receptor field. What we know, 
is that the activity of the architecture will be subject to neural oscillations that in humans, when 
conscious, are between beta and gamma waves, and will be compatible with top-down processes 
of sensory modulation or prediction. 
 
Although being an inoperant definition, we still can define this architecture as an indefinite set of 
neural networks with the previous explained qualities: 
 
𝑃𝑒𝑟 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑗 … 𝜔𝑘) 
 
Finally, it is important to remark that the existence of perceptual architectures does not imply the 
existence of a single area or a single net composed by neurons fully dedicated to the perceptual 
processes. What we suggest is the probable existence of specialized networks that works together 
with other networks that overlaps different functions and encodes different features: this is, 
inside 𝑃𝑒𝑟 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑗 … 𝜔𝑘) we will find neural networks that probably are present too in, for 
example, 𝐼𝑛𝑡 = 𝑓(𝜔𝑟 … 𝜔𝑠). 
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As it is demonstrated, conscious perception depends on two specific time windows. This is a crucial 
variable, the base of the Two Stage model, and a dimension that Feinberg and Mallatt not explored 
in the Neurobiological Naturalism, since is an approach not based on the real-time functionality of 
conscious brains but in the common neurobiological characteristics of conscious ones. 
 
2.1. Operationalization 
The first time-window on the process of consciousness is the time window related to the non-
perceptual processes itself. This is, the first time-window is the time that brain uses to collect 
sensory data, integrate it, give it valences and interpretations, and prepare it to be attracted to 
the perceptive pathways (Herzog et al., 2016). Thus, this pre-conscious time window (∆𝑡𝛼) can 
be conceived as the sum of its fractions (∆𝑡𝑚), where the neural processes takes place. Note that  
𝑚, 𝑤 ∈ ℕ  and indicates a fraction of  ∆𝑡𝛼 , which can take a value  ∆𝑡𝑚 < 400𝑚𝑠 or a value ∆𝑡𝑤  
inside a fraction ∆𝑡𝑚. Thus: 
 
∆𝑡𝛼 =  {∆𝑡𝑚𝑛} =  {∆𝑡𝑚1, ∆𝑡𝑚2, ∆𝑡𝑚3 , … } 
∆𝑡𝑚 = {∆𝑡𝑤𝑛} =  {∆𝑡𝑤1 , ∆𝑡𝑤2 , ∆𝑡𝑤3 , … } 
Then ∆𝑡𝛼 > 400𝑚𝑠 
Then ∆𝑡𝑚 < 400𝑚𝑠 
Then  ∆𝑡𝑤 < ∆𝑡𝑚 <  ∆𝑡𝛼  
 
The second time window is the duration of a perceptual experience (∆𝑡𝛽). By the time, it cannot 
be defined as well as the previous one because a lack of data, but we can infer its lesser duration 
in relation to ∆𝑡𝛼 , so: 
∆𝑡𝛽 =  {∆𝑡𝑏𝑛} = {∆𝑡𝑏1, ∆𝑡𝑏2,∆𝑡𝑏3 , … } 
Where ∆𝑡𝛽 < 400𝑚𝑠 ; ∆𝑡𝛼 ≠  ∆𝑡𝛽  
 
Finally, the time window structures the order of the successes that give rise to a conscious 
experience. In a hypothetically and theoretical case, ∆𝑡𝛽  is the first timeframe in which the arriving 
inputs are processed, and ∆𝑡𝛼  is the time in which the results of these first cause-effects are 
compiled and decoded by the perceptual architecture. If this cycle is completed by a system, we 
can argue that it has been conscious during, for example, 0.5ms? Not at all. Our integrative 
proposal needs a final step that will be discussed in the final section of this prototype. 
 
3. Externally triggered processes 
By the time, we described what kind of structure is necessary to perceive consciously, and what is the 
time window in which this can happen. But although we situated our model in a spatiotemporal 
structure, we need a form to describe the specific processes that will trigger the change between ∆𝑡𝛼  
and ∆𝑡𝛽. In this direction, we can differentiate two processes that will take place during ∆𝑡𝛼 ; externally 
triggered processes and internally triggered processes. This is, the stimuli-response specific neural 
patterns that ∆𝑡𝛼  will include through Π. 
 
3.1. Operationalization 
The externally triggered processes, or 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), are the resultant set of neural electrochemical 
activity provoked by stimuli from the external senses (body or environment) interacting in a 
cascade of stimuli-response activity between neurons. The first step on this process is the neural 
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reception of the encoded stimuli, that normally is triggered by a sensorial receptor. This will 
provoke an initial neural response (𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛)) that will produce a specific pattern of activation 
(𝑒𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛)).  This is, theoretically assuming the full physical, chemical and biological 
characteristics of Π, the resultant 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼) can be predicted by the time that we can predict the 
behavior of every  𝜔  given a first cause or input (𝑖𝑛𝑝(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛)). In other words, the specific 
interaction between a first specific neuron 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) and a specific encoded input from a specific 
receptor 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛) will trigger a cascade of stimuli through a neural network 𝜔𝑖  shaping the 
form of a specific pattern of activations 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼). This is: 
 
𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼) = {𝑒𝑖} =  {𝑒1, 𝑒2,  𝑒3, … } 
 
Where 𝑒𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛) = 𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖) 
 
Where 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 = 𝑟𝑒𝑠(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛), 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) 
 
This also explain to us that the modelled architecture Π needs to include specific variables related 
to the chemical and electrical dynamic of every neuron, and the physical and chemical dynamics 
of the synapsis to explain the specific activity of the circuit and the time used to reach the deepest 
layers (membrane resistance, distance between neurons, etc). By the time, this escapes from our 
little knowledge, but would be a great improvement for the model reaching a mathematical 
definition of the 𝑒 function. 
 
4. Internally triggered processes 
In parallel to the externally triggered processes, a ∆𝑡𝛼 must include inherent neural activity. This 
“actual” activity can be originated in a previous moment by stimuli-response patterns, and the ∆𝑡𝛼 
simply traps inside the moment the first neuron activated on its timeframe. Other causes of activation, 
no directly triggered by a previous neuron, can be also interpreted as the first cause of internally 
triggered processes, like cell clocks or chemical dynamics, including the effects of the glia, the 
maintenance of neurotransmitter in the synaptic space, etc. 
 
4.1. Operationalization 
Its operativization follows a parallelism with the previous processes. In this case, the internally 
triggered processes 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) does not depends on an external input but depends on internal first 
causes 𝑖𝑛𝑠(∆𝑡𝑤). By the rest, its operativization follows the same structure: 
 
𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) = {𝜈𝑖} =  {𝜈1, 𝜈2 ,  𝜈3 , … } 
 
Where 𝜈𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛) = 𝜈(𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖 , 𝜔𝑖) 
 
Where 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖 = 𝑖𝑛𝑛(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑖(∆𝑡𝑤𝑛)), 𝑢𝑖(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧)) 
 
4.2. Spatiotemporal synchronization 
While this model cannot explain how every neural network must behave to generate significant data, 
like the example of the structural variables, it is necessary to include in the INMC a restrictive variable. 
This is, we can have a perfect structure Π prepared to perceive, and we can have externally triggered 
processes and internally triggered processes through the structure, but if these processes are 
disordered spatially or temporally, the processing coherence will be lost. Thus, we stablish  Γ , the 
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spatiotemporal synchronization of the processes, as an essential feature of the perceptive process. 
We aim to remark the incapacity of this model to introduce more operativization by the time, and we 
defend that this is a variable that in a hypothetical development of the model will be lost thanks to 
the deep understanding of the systemic relations between neurons through electrochemical stimuli-
response activity. 
 
5. Perceptive patterns 
Finally, the internally and externally triggered patterns will reach what Herzog called an attractor state 
(Herzog et al., 2016). An integrative point that triggers the stimuli to generate, through the disposed 
brain architecture, the specific patterns that encodes the final moment of perception. The global, 
combined, unified and significant information, entangled in a non-specified-by-the-moment structure 
that encodes sensory and internal data to generate a meaningful lapse of time. In a little fraction of a 
second the information of at least the previous 400ms will be broadcasted in a long-range structure 
in compacted bites. This is, the perceptive architecture does not process again all the hierarchical 
integration: we don’t perceive movement as a progression of dots in our visual field, we perceive 
movement as an attributed characteristic that certain neural networks constructed thanks to the dot-
by-dot sensory input (Herzong et al., 2016). We propose, moreover, that the encoded and signified 
data that enters to the perceptive structures is the data that will we recorded and maintained through 
memory structures instead of the full amount of single sensory inputs. 
 
5.1. Operationalization 
Thus, perceptive patterns 𝐾(∆𝑡𝛽) will be the result of the spatiotemporally synchronized (Γ) 
previous internally and externally triggered processes, 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼) and 𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), through a structure Π. 
Then: 
𝐾(∆𝑡𝛽) = 𝐾(𝐸(∆𝑡𝛼), 𝐼(∆𝑡𝛼), Π) ∙ Γ = {𝑘𝑛} =  {𝑘1, 𝑘2 , 𝑘3, … }  
Where 𝑘𝑛 = 𝑘(𝑒𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛), 𝜈𝑖(∆𝑡𝑚𝑛), 𝜔𝑗) ∙ Γ   
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